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Introduction
During the past three décades, economists hâve developed théories of al
truism that départ in différent ways from the narrowly conceived Homo
economicus model. Thèse théories can be broadly classified into three broad
approaches. The first, called hère the "egoistic" perspective, can be seen
as a variant of reciprocal coopération models such as the one proposed
by Axelrod (1984). It maintains that one may share his income with ano-
ther to induce a reciprocal transfer in the future. The second, named the
"egocentric" view, as epitomized in Becker (1976), argues that the donor's
utility function includes the utility of potential récipients. That is, the donor
would donate a resource if the vicarious enjoyment of watching the pleasure
of others exceeds at the margin the donor's satisfaction from consuming the
resource himself. The third, dubbed the "altercentric" framework ("alter"
after the Latin "other"), can be surmised from the work of Mead (1934),
Etzioni (1986), Frank (1988), and Simon (1990). It views the benefactor's
action as stemming from a moral dictum as binding as rules of honesty.
Smith leveled direct criticisms against three théories of altruism cur-
rent in his time. Amazingly, thèse théories are replicas of the ones just men-
tioned. Smith put forward an alternative based on the idea of sympathy.
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Although a few modem writers hâve noted Smith's theory (e.g., Collard,
(1978; Frank, (1988), a fewer realized its pertinence to the modem debate.
Section one provides a succinct statement of Smith's theory. Section two
summarizes Smith's critique of the three théories of his time. Section three
identifies the modem approaches and shows how they still fail to answer
Smith's critique.
Back to Smith
1.1 The Principle of Sympathy
Smith's theory of ethics was greatly influenced by David Hume's notion of
sympathy (Mackie, (1980; Haakonssen, (1981). However, in The Theory of
Mord Sentiments, Smith departed from Hume's utilitarian position, which
portrays sympathy as the mechanism by which the agent calculâtes social
welfare. For Smith, sympathy stems from instantaneous sentiments towards
immédiate expériences; it does not generally arise from meditated calcula-
tion of the welfare of ail concerned. Smith viewed sympathy as the foun-
dation of virtues pursued for their own sake, not for the sake of advancing
social welfare. He regarded sympathy to be the foundation of beneficence
(altruism). self-command (the propriety of behavior), respect and admira
tion, and social rank (Khalil (1990), (1996)).
Concerning benevolence, Smith stressed that sympathy expresses the
genuine concern over the interests of others, in short "other-interest". This
concern entails that the benefactor has to suspend his own interest. The
négation of self-interest, however, does not mean that altruism stems from
a principle, which is radically différent from self-interest. For Smith, the
motive to satisfy self-interest and other-interest stems from the same gé
néral tendency of humans to sympathize- in one case with the self and in
the other with the beneficiary. That is, Smith did not view self-interest as
radically différent from other-interest : both are simply différent instances of
sympathy. We witness that raan acts more often in sympathy with the self
(i.e., out of self-interest) because man is obviously more familiar with the
circumstance of his own self than with the circumstance of others. That is,
for Smith, there is no fundamental distinction, but only a différence in de-
gree, between one's own feelings as opposed to the feeling of others towards
one's interest.
To be précise, however, Smith appears to note a différence between
self-interest and the sympathy of others with one's interest. While self-
interest seems to be an "original" sensation, the sympathy of others with
one's interest does not take place immediately. Rather, it is a mediated
or "reflected" sympathy with the agent who is originally experiencing the
benefit or pain :Elias L. Khalil 423
Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended
to his own care;and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and
abler to take care of himself than of any other person. Every man feels his
own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people.
The former are original sensations; the latter the reflected or sympathetic
images of those sensation. The former may be said to be the substance, the
latter the shadow (Smith (1976) p. 219).
That is, a spectator can assess a benefit or pain only through the reac
tion of the agent who is experiencing it. Nonetheless, this différence does not
change the claim posited hère that there is no fondamental distinction bet
ween self-interest and sympathy. When an agent sympathizes with someone
else's feelings towards, e.g., an apple, it is a reflective sensation. Likewise,
when the agent sympathizes with his own feelings towards the apple, it is
also a reflective sensation : That is, both sensations involve sympathy and.
hence, by définition, are reflective of original sensations. The only différence
between the two cases arises from the degree of familiarity occasioned by
the usual fact that the agent is more familiar with his own feelings than
with the feelings of the other. (To note, however, this is not always trueas
in the case when an agent is more attuned to the feelings of others than to
his own.)
For altruism, the degree of familiarity is crucialand agents act most of
the time in a self-interested manner only because they are familiar mostly
with their own original sensations than with the original sensations of others.
Obviously, there is a stronger motive to help a stranded person if the person
happens to be a close acquaintance rather than, ceteris paribus, a distant
associate. And man is more motivated to help, after himself, the ones who
live in the same house with him than "the greater part of other people" :
After himself, the members of his own family, those who usually live in the
same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters,
are naturally the objects of his warmest affections. They are naturally and
usually the persons upon whose happiness or misery his conduct must hâve
the greatest influence. He is more habituated to sympathize with them. He
knows better how every thing is likely to afféct them, and his sympathy
with them is more précise and determinate, than it can be with the greater
part of other people. It approaches nearer, in short, to what he feels for
himself (Smith (1976) p. 219).
Social proximity, in addition, illuminâtes for Smith why the agent feels
less affection towards the children of his cousins than towards the children
of his sisters and brothers :
The children of cousins, being still less connected [than "the children of
brothers and sisters"], are of still less importance to one another;and the
affection gradually diminishes as the relation grows more and more remote
(Smith (1976) p. 220).
Social remoteness also explains for Smith why the parent-child affec
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A father apt to be less attached to a child, who, by some accident, has been
separated from him in its infancy, and who does not return to him till it is
grown up to manhood. The father is apt to feel less paternal tenderness for
the child; the child, less filial révérence for the father. Brothers and sisters,
when they hâve been educated in distant countries, are apt to feel a similar
diminution of affection (Smith (1976) pp. 220-221).
Smith's notion of social proximity is conceptually analogous to genetic
proximity at the biological level. Sociobiologists hâve employed such genetic
proximity as the explaining factor of altruism in human and non-human ani
mais, what is known as the "inclusive fitness" hypothesis (Hamilton (1964);
Wilson (1975)). The contrast between Smith's theory and the inclusive fit
ness hypothesis cannot be elaborated hère. However, it is suflicient to state
that the ideas of social proximity and genetic proximity try to account for
the strength or weakness of sympathetic sentiments. Whether sympathetic
sentiments are learned reactions through conditioning, or hâve deep biolo
gical foundation, is another issue that is not discussed hère.
It is sufficient to note that Smith's theory allows us to conceive al
truism as an elastic behavior. It varies with the variation of social proximity;
it is not limited by fixed genetic proximity. To account for social proximity,
which partially détermines the altruistic act, we need an operative morpho-
logy of the station of the actor in relation to the récipient's.
1.2 Sympathy as Station Switching
As stated above, Smith's principle of sympathy entails continuity between
the pursuits of self-interest (what Smith calls the "virtue of prudence" ) and
other-interest {the "virtue of beneficence"). He grounded the commensura-
bility between self- and other-interest on the "self acting from a separate
station-a station that impartially adjudicates between the needs of the self
and the needs of the other :
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives... unless we remove
ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station and endeavor to view
them as at a certain distance from us. ... We endeavor to examine our own
conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine
it (Smith (1976) p. 110) (emphasis added).
When I endeavor to examine my own conduct... it is évident that... I divide
myself into two persons; and that I, the examiner and the judge, represent a
différent character from that other I. the person whose conduct is examined
into the judged of (Smith (1976) p. 113).
For Smith, humans are capable of judging themselves because the
principle they use to judge others is readily available :
The principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our own
conduct, seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise
the like judgements concerning the conduct of other people (Smith (1976)
p. 107).Elias L. Khalil 425
However, there is an irregularity that Smith overlooks. Agents often
apply double standards : In many cases, agents tend to do what they would
condemn in others. At first examination at least, there is a différence bet-
ween the agent-as-actor and the agent-as-judge. Agents in many occasions
do not switch stations when they judge their own actions as fairly as when
they judge the actions of others. Although Smith discusses many other ir-
regularities stemming from the weakness of character, such as false pride
and self-aggrandizement (Khalil (1996)), he does not discuss this irregula
rity explicitly. Smith does discuss similar self-biases, such as self-deception,
and reasons that "gênerai rules", or what modem economists call "institu
tions" , arise to correct them. It would be outside the scope of this essay to
détail Smith's discussion of the origin of gênerai rules (see Khalil (2000) pp.
381-384). However, following Smith's order of theoretical approximations,
it would be consistent to assume, at first level of generality, that agents do
not suffer from double standards, and then account for anomalies such as
double standards, and corresponding remédies, at second and third levels of
generalities. In this light, double standards are not fatal anomalies because
they can explain the origin of gênerai rules.
Disregarding double standards, self-judgment, for Smith, is possible
because nature has endowed the agent with the quest to be "what he himself
approves of other men", and to "dread the very thought of resembling" what
he hâtes and despises in other people (Ibid. p. 117). Thus, when the agent
examines the merit of his action, he adopts the view of a would-be impartial
spectatoror at least he is supposed to adopt the view of the impartial spec
tator. It is true that almost ail people, at least in a few occasions, fail to do
so. But this is a problem for second and third theoretical approximations
as just noted.
Smith's theory of sentiments resembles, at the formai level only howe
ver, Becker's egocentric approach. It differs from Becker's at the substantive
level. To reconstruct Smith's theory, we hâve at hand the station of the ac-
ting self, S, the station of the récipient other, O, and the station of the
would-be impartial spectator occupied by the self reflecting on itself, coined
hère "spectator self." Ss. Figure 1 illustrâtes such a three-station scénario,
where Ss examines the utilities of O and Ss from a detached, third station
whose location is determined by the degree of familiarity. The occupation
of the third station of the impartial spectator by the actor himself has two
clear implications. First, when the actor empathizes with the suffering of the
other, it is not by imagining such suffering as happening to his own person
as supposed by Becker's egocentric view. Second, the judge of the potential
action is not an actual spectator for two reasons. The first reason is that
the judge is not a disinterested observer according to whose opinion agent 5
tries to conform. In other words, we do not hâve hère a socialization process
where 5 tries to appease the public and gain its applause. Rather, S adopts
the view of Ss - the impartial spectator who émerges which S examines his
own act from a distance. Such a Smithian approach means that, at first ap
proximation, the "self précèdes public opinion or the sociocultural milieu.426 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 67(4), 2001
lst Station 5 ^ «^ 2rd Station O
2nd Station O
Figure 1 : Three-Station Scénario of Altruism
But, for Smith, the milieu is not totally disregarded. It plays a rôle when it
helps the formation of the self by allowing the agent to reflect on his action
as he does on the action of others. Without society, the agent cannot take
a look at his action from a distance. So, society acts as a reflection mirror
that clarifies and intensifies 5's view of himself. For Smith, while society is
essential for the development of the self, it does not act as a construction
engineer à la Mead.
The second reason is that the judge of the action is not O as entailed
by the Mead/Frank altercentric view. Rather, it is Ss who judges, given
the degree of familiarity, whether the benefit of O is worth satisfying at
the expense of S's interest. This entails that, besides familiarity, one has to
introduce the issue of comparative benefit in order to provide a determinate
judgment if someone should help a potential beneficiary. It is insufficient
that the other is a close associate. The benefactor may prefer to donate
funds to a charity that helps abused children than to help a less needy but
a closer acquaintance. Smith did not discuss the issue of comparative benefit
explicitly. However, Smith succeeded in locating the question of familiarity
or sympathy as the proper entry point to the study of altruism.
1.3 The Advantages of Smith's Theory
Smith's notion of sympathy is fruitful for several reasons. First, Smith uses
the concept "sympathy" in a sensé much broader than altruism. He employs
it to explain étiquettes, the propriety of émotions in public, the judgement of
respect, the expression of admiration, and so on (Khalil (1990), (1996)). Se
cond, Smith's notion of sympathy allows one to commence with the interac
tion of rational agents-where agents make décisions in light of préférences of
the self and cared-about other, constraints, and technology. Smith's notion
of sympathy accounts for altruism without appealing to spécial préférences.
In this sensé, Smith's notion accords with one major thrust of économie
theory, i.e.. the stability of préférences : Do not start theorizing at the abs-
tract level by tracing différences in décisions to différences in préférences
(Stigler &: Becker (1977))ranging from God's commandments, social values
and commitments, genetic/biological factors, to cultural institutions. The
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question : why do préférences differ ? In fact, one may use Smith's notion
of sympathy to uncover the origin of many cultural institutions and social
norms.
Third, Smith's approach locates the explaining variable, sympathy,
at the same level as the explained item, the genuine concern about the
recipient's welfare. Fourth, Smith's notion allows us to avoid the arbitrary
division of agents into the altruist and egoist types (e.g., Becker (1976)). To
détermine who is the altruist and who is the benefîciary, one does not even
need to assume différent intensities of sympathetic sentiments or appeal to
tastes. The only déterminant can be relative incomes or endowments.
Fifth. Smith's notion permits us to use the principle of rationality in
the sensé of the maximization model of standard économies; i.e., there is
no need for the evolutionary Darwinian model or, in spécifie, the inclusive
fitness hypothesis. This is an advantage since the evolutionary model cannot
explain easily altruism when there is no genetic proximity.1
Sixth, Smith's starting point with sympathy highlights the importance
of social proximity (Smith (1976) pp. 219-221). Familiarity provides the
operative morphology of the station of the actor in relation to the station of
the potential beneficiary. To quote Smith on the importance of familiarity,
as much as a man of humanity in Europe sympathizes with the victims of a
calamity in China, he is. "provided he never saw them", more stressed for
losing his little finger :
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with ail its myriads of inhabi
tants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how
a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part
of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful
calamity. He would, I imagine, first of ail, express very strongly his sorrow
for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy
reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of ail the
labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. ... And when
ail this fine philosophy was over, when ail thèse humane sentiments had
been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure,
take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if
no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could
befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his
little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never
saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of
a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense
multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry
misfortune of his own (Smith (1976) pp. 136-137).2
The suggestion that evolutionary theory is somewhat irrelevant goes against the work of Frank (1988),
Margolis (1982), Simon (1990), Bergstrom (1995), Getty (1989), and many others who try to trace altruism
to some genetic foundation. Even if sympathy has some biological foundation, one cannot explain the variety
of choices by appeating to gènes. Also, if sympathy has a biological foundation, it does not mean it is the
product of natural sélection. In fact, natural sélection cannot explain the origin of sympathy; it can only
explain its diffusion given that it exists. The inclination to invoke natural sélection as soon as one appeais to
the reievance of biology with respect to behavior probably stems from the misidentification of organization
(physiology) with evolutionary diffusion (evolutionary biology) (see passim Boyd & Noble, (1993);Rosen,
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Seventh, Smith's notion of sympathy allows us to model self- and
other-interest (what he calls the virtues of "prudence" and "beneficence" )
as lying along a continuum. In this regard, Smith's conception is congruent,
as suggested earlier, with the modem egocentric view, where altruism is
regarded as a motive in the utility function that is smoothly substitutable
with self-interested motives.
2 Smith's Critique of Three Théories of Altruism of
His Time
Although he referred to them by différent names, Smith explicitly and em-
phatically censured what is called hère Axelrod's egoistic, Becker's egocen
tric, and Mead/Frank's altercentric théories of altruism. With regard to
the egoistic approach, which stresses self-interest as almost the sole motive,
Smith castigated its représentative of his day, viz., Bernard Mandeville.
Smith ((1976) pp. 308-313) pointed out that Mandeville's view couldn't
even distinguish selfishness from legitimate self-interest or what Smith cal
led the "virtue of prudence." While Mandeville equated self-interest with
vice, Smith regarded the pursuit of self-interest as a legitimate, moral task
entrusted by "Nature" in us : "The préservation and healthful state of the
body seem to be the objects which Nature first recommends to the care of
every individual" (Ibid., p. 212).
Moreover, Smith chided the exemplary of the egocentric explanation
of his time, viz., Thomas Hobbes, which self-centric, vicarious pleasure as
the sole motive. Although Hobbes did not develop fully his theory of political
psychology. it entailed that the act of altruism is aimed at enhancing the
donor's utility by imagining the conditions of the récipient as happening to
the donor's own station. A famous vignette told by John Aubrey illustrâtes
Hobbes' view :
One time, I remember, goeing in the Strand, a poor and infirme old man
craved his (Hobbes') aimes. He, beholding him with eies of pitty and com
passion, putt his hand in his pocket, and gave him 6d. Sayd a divine (scil.
Dr. Jaspar Mayne) that stood by-'Would you hâve donne this, if it had
not been Christ's command?'-'Yea', sayd he.-'Why?' quoth the other.-
'Because', sayd he, 'I was in paine to consider the misérable condition of
the old man; and now my aimes, giving him some reliefe, doth also ease me'
(Aubrey (1898) p. 352).
That is, the reason behind the donation is the alleviation of the donor's
discomfort at the sight of a beggar. The improvement of the beggar's income
is the donor's attempt to enhance his vicarious pleasure. In response to
Hobbes' egocentricism, Smith stressed that the sympathetic act involves
putting one's self in the other's station rather than judging the other's
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if it entails imagining the other's conditions as happening to one's station,
i.e.. one's "own person and character" :
Sympathy ... cannot, in any sensé, be regarded as a selfish principle. When
I sympathize with your sorrow or your indignation, it may be pretended,
indeed, that my émotion is founded in self-love, because it arises from brin-
ging your case home to myself, from putting myself in your situation, and
hence conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances. But though
sympathy is very properly said to arise from imaginary change of situations
with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not sup-
posed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the
person with whom I sympathize. When I condole with you for the loss of
your son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person
of such character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son
was unfortunately to die : but I consider what I should suffer if I was really
you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons
and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not
in the least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish. How can
that be regarded as a selfish passion, which does not arise even from the
imagination of any thing that has befallen, or that relates to myself, in my
own proper person and character, but which is entirely occupied about what
relates to you ? A raan may sympathize with a woman in child-bed; though
it is impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in his
own proper person and character (Smith (1976) p. 317).
In addition, Smith attacked the altercentric position of his âge, which
appeals to moral dictums, as expressed in the moral philosophy of Francis
Hutcheson and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Smith conside-
red them as leftovers from the médiéval philosophy of the Christian church.
Smith ((1976) pp. 139-140, 300-304) distanced himself from the "whining
and melancholy moralists" such as Hutcheson who identifîed virtue exclusi-
vely with altruism.3 This identification implies that self-interest is basically
selfish and amoral-a position which is ironically. as Smith notes, similar to
Mandeville's-while virtue is basically about the adoption of the interest of
others or the community at large. For such an altercentric view, there is
little room left for self-interest. The négation of self-interest occurs when
the self transports itself totally from its station to the station of others.
This means that one adopts the needs of others while dismisses one's own
needs and wants as illegitimate, immoral, and selfish.
Such an altercentric stand implies that altruism stems from strict mo
ral dictums not différent from honesty or obligatory commitment in gênerai.
Smith ((1976) pp. 78-82) explicitly criticized such an implication when he
distinguished between sympathy, the origin of altruism or what he called
"beneficence", and honesty, which stems from what he called "justice".1
3 Such identification is to some extent echoed in récent philosophical literature. For example, Sagoff (1986)
opposes "self-interest" and "public values" on the basis that the later are reflective. Likewise, Postema (1987)
contrasts "personal values" and "collective values." Goodin (1980) argues that cost-benefit calculations
should be totally differentiated from ethical considérations. Likewise, Walzer (1983) distinguishes ethical
tastes (what he calls "obligations") on the basis of being "sacred" from économie sphère of efficient rationality.
4 Therefore, it is surprising that Geoffrey Brennan and Lomasky (1985) appeal to Smith's concept of sympathy
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The conflation of the two is the core of the conception of altruism as sub-
ject to rules not différent from the rules of justice. Smith ((1976) part VII)
dedicated the last part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments to the critique
of médiéval moral philosophers, whom he called the "casuists", for trea-
ting voluntary action such as altruism as subject to strict rules of justice.
Casuists acted as prigs or pédants, according to Smith. They failed to ob
serve the arena of beneficence as separate from obligatory commitments.
For Smith ((1976) pp. 78-82), beneficence, unlike justice or rules against
cheating, is similar to prudence and, hence, is subject to évaluation in light
of circumstances.
3 The Modem Reincarnation of the Three Théories
Insofar as sympathy is the spring of altruism, it allows agents to act not ac
cording to stratégie calculation but rather according to the concern over the
welfare of others-contrary to the egoistic view. It also allows agents to act
not out of self-indulgence in vicariously experiencing the pleasure of others
but rather out of genuine concern-contrary to the egocentric approach. In
addition, it allows agents to act not according to obligatory behavior but ra
ther out of familiarly and relative circumstances-contrary to the altercentric
view.
Smith's view challenges the three approaches represented by Axelrod,
Becker, and Mead/Etzioni/Frank/Simon in the same ways Smith confron-
ted their parallel représentations of his time. Concerning the modem egois
tic perspective, epitomized by Axelrod's "tit-for-tat" strategy, it was not
designed originally to explain altruism, but rather to explain coopérative
behavior with regard to non-cheating stratégies. Insofar as coopérative be
havior is not confused with altruism, Axelrod's egoistic approach has many
insights to learn from. However, insofar as altruism appears to be a non-
selfish act, as evidentially the case in single-spot encounters, the egoistic
approach is problematic if it extends itself to explain such altruistic acts.
By extending itself to the phenomenon of altruism, the egoistic ap
proach maintains that agents assist others strategically, i.e., to induce them
to reciprocate favors. That is, ail actions are motivated ultimately by self-
interest. As such, it suffers from the same shorteoming that Smith found
in Mandeville's approach. It cannot differentiate between selfishness and
legitimate self-interest.
Concerning Becker's egocentric perspective, it maintains that bene-
factors increase their utility by imagining how récipients are enjoying the
self-interest. While voting behavior may stem from obligatory commitment, Smith's principte of sympathy
cannot account for such a commitment. While Smith did not discuss explicitly obligatory commitment, it
might be derived from his discussion of the virtue of justice that he explicitly distanced from sympathy
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donated goods. This egocentric explanation can account for single-spot tran
sactions, where the egoistic approach fails. In fact, the egocentric explana
tion, as mentioned earlier, resembles, formally, Smith's explanation. Ho
wever. the egocentric explanation basically cannot distinguish benefactors
from masochists who endure disutility when they donate resources in the
hope of attaining an offsetting level of arousal. In other words. the maso-
chist, similar to any rational agent, suffers from pain (disutility) when he
donates resources. But he expects to be compensated by a greater vicarious
pleasure, experienced from his own station, when he watches the pleasure of
the récipient. Becker's model entails that altruists should feel joyful over the
prospect of the miseries of others because such miseries occasion for them
the opportunity to be aroused. In fact. Becker recognizes this strange impli
cation, noted earlier by Hobbes, when he approvingly quotes the statement
made by a beneficiary to his benefactors in Charles Dickens's Bleak House :
It's only you, the generous créatures, whom I envy. ... I envy you your power
of doing what you do. It is what I should revel in, myself. I don't feel any
vulgar gratitude to you. I almost feel as if you ought to be grateful to me,
for giving you the opportunity of enjoying the luxury of generosity. ... I may
hâve corne into the world expressly for the purpose of increasing your stock
of happiness. I may hâve been born to be a benefactor to you by sometimes
giving you an opportunity of assisting me in my little perplexities (cited by
Becker (1981) p. 13, n. 2).
The inability to distinguish the masochist from the altruist is a direct
outcome of the way Becker models charity or caring, which Smith has found
déficient in Hobbes' theory. Sure enough, there are many acts of resource
sharing that are motivated by self-centered indulgences that agents seek to
satisfy. However, hardly any thinker would not be disturbed by the prospect
of identifying ail acts of altruism as merely variants of masochism.
Concerning Mead/Prank's altercentric view, it avoids the failings of
the egoistic and the egocentric perspectives : The altercentric view can ac
count for resource-sharing where the agent is involved in single-spot tran
sactions and does not stand to extract vicarious satisfaction. This is possi
ble because the altercentric view regards altruism as stemming from moral
dictums and, hence, can account for single-spot transfers stemming out of
genuine concerns. However, the altercentric view implies that altruism does
not differ from strict rules of justice - such as obligatory commitments not
to cheat or violate the property rights of others. To be accurate, it might be
the case that many instances of resource-sharing stem from fairness and the
désire not to appear as a "free-rider." This désire explains volunteering to
support the local fîre department, complying with pollution-control custo-
mary rules, or supporting commonly shared resources. However, there is a
domain of resource sharing that does not arise from obligatory commitment.
Insofar as the altercentric approach over-extends itself to explain altruism,
it raises some questions.
For instance, the critical factor in altruism is sympathy, which plays

























Figure 2 : Domains of Resource-Sharing
that the concern over other-interest arises from particular station switching
and, hence, voluntary, while moral dictums (or "moral gène" according to
biological versions of the altercentric view (Frank (1988))) dictate action
with usually little regard to the particular circumstances or persons invol-
ved. If one advances the principle of sympathy to explain voluntary acts of
altruism à la Smith, one would spare himself the need to introduce the ques
tion of commitment via Sen ((1977), (1985); cf. Khalil (1999)) and Frankfurt
(1971). In fact, one would not need to invoke the multiple-self framework à
la Etzioni ((1986) ;see Sen, (1980/1981)) as well. Put differently, as Smith
noted in his critique of Hucheson, there are many acts of resource sharing
which do not fall under strict rules of justice. Such acts are rather non-
obligatory and contingent on particular circumstances.
4 Conclusion
Monroe ((1994), (1996), chs. 6-9) reviews différent théories of altruism along
disciplinary Unes separating sociology, économies, biology, and psychology.
In comparison, this paper proves that what matters is the conceptual core,
which transcends the somewhat artificial divisions among disciplines and
even linguistic and intellectual apparatuses separated by centuries.
The paper finds three major théories of altruism that eut across the
social sciences and intellectual milieus : the egoistic, egocentric, and alter
centric perspectives. The paper argues that neither Axelrod's egoistic view,
Becker's egocentric approach, nor Mead/Frank's altercentric perspective co-
vers altruistic resource sharing as understood by Smith. The received three
théories are rather about stratégie, masochist, or obligatory resource sha
ring. As summarized in Figure 1, the three modem théories do not explain
altruism as stemming from genuine sentiments about the welfare of others.
The egoistic approach explains instead reciprocity as a stratégie act to en-
hance future benefit in infinitely repeated games. The egocentric view re
gards resource-sharing as no différent from a utility-arousing masochist act :
the actor inflicts pain on himself (donates resources) to allow his own person
- Le., without switching stations - to expérience enjoyment via the stimu
lus of watching the récipient's pleasure. The altercentric agenda is actuallyElias L. Khalil 433
about fixed canons and, hence, cannot express the voluntary and varied cha-
racter of altruism. Insofar as altruism is a non-strategic, non-masochistic,
and non-obligatory action, thèse théories are generally déficient at first ap
proximation.
Smith's theory of sympathy offers a better starting point to unders-
tand non-strategic, non-masochist, and non-obligatory transfers of resour
ces. Rather than starting with the egoist, ego-centered, or alter-centered
agent, Smith commences with a normal agent who is capable of true sym
pathy in the sensé that he can distance himself from his own station, but
without totally disregarding his own self-interest. Such an agent may share
his resources with others even in single-spot transactions, which the egoist
would not. Such an agent may "empathize" with others by transferring him
self to their station, which the ego-centered would not. And such an agent
may make his grant contingent on his sympathy and cost-benefit calculation,
which the alter-centered prig would not.
Put in simple terms, Smith's approach shows that the altruistic sensé
of resource sharing is neither made from the first station of the actor, as
maintained by the egoistic and egocentric approaches, nor from the second
station of the récipient, as postulated by the altercentric approach. Rather,
following Smith, the décision maker is situated externally to the actor and
the récipient, viz., in an imagined third station. For the theorist to détermine
the extent of assistance, the theorist needs to specify the extent of familia-
rity. Moreover, the theorist needs to specify the benefactor's loss relative to
the beneficiary's valuation of the assistance.
Although Smith did not discuss the question of comparative utility,
he brought to our attention the centrality of station switching and judging
from a distance (i.e., sympathy) for the understanding of altruism. One
implication is that human society is not held together solely on the ground
of self-interested and self-indulging passions. Also. for human society to
subsist, there is no need for an authority empowered by an external System
of ethics. Human fraternity arises from the every-day interaction of agents
that nurtures familiarity. What is unique about Smith's approach is that
the principle, which originates fraternity, i.e., sympathy, is the same one
that makes the agent interested in promoting his own self-interest. In his
critique of Mandeville, Smith was explicit that the pursuit of self-interest is
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